Brigham Young University Prelaw Review
Volume 29

Article 6

4-1-2015

"English-only or Ethnocentrism? Toward a Sociological
Understanding of English-only Case Law"
Ian Peacock
Pablo Tapia

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byuplr
Part of the Law Commons

BYU ScholarsArchive Citation
Peacock, Ian and Tapia, Pablo (2015) ""English-only or Ethnocentrism? Toward a Sociological
Understanding of English-only Case Law"," Brigham Young University Prelaw Review: Vol. 29 , Article 6.
Available at: https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byuplr/vol29/iss1/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at BYU ScholarsArchive. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Brigham Young University Prelaw Review by an authorized editor of BYU ScholarsArchive.
For more information, please contact scholarsarchive@byu.edu, ellen_amatangelo@byu.edu.

English-only or Ethnocentrism? Toward a
Sociological Understanding of English-only
Case Law
Ian Peacock and Pablo Tapia1

H

I. Introduction

éctor García was a second generation Mexican-American
who grew up speaking Spanish in his home. García was
hired by Gloor Lumber and Supply as a salesman, in part
because of his bilingual abilities.2 The store, located in Brownsville,
Texas, served a large Hispanic demographic, which engendered the
demand for the ability to speak Spanish proficiently. Management
often praised García’s work and he received a bonus in his first year
of employment.3 Gloor Lumber however, objected to García’s tendency to violate the company’s rarely enforced English-only rule.4
Gloor employees, 31 out of 39 of whom were Mexican-American,
1
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were prohibited from speaking Spanish on the job unless they were
helping Hispanic customers. On June 10, 1975 a fellow MexicanAmerican employee asked García about an item that a customer
was looking for. García responded in Spanish that the item was not
available. Alton Gloor, an officer of the lumber store, overhead the
exchange and subsequently informed García that he was fired for
violating the English-only rule.
Invoking Title VII, a statute designed to protect employees from
discrimination based on national origin, García went to court and
charged his former employer with action of discriminatory impact.
The notion was rejected, however, under the court’s ruling that “neither the statute nor common understanding equates national origin
with the language that one chooses [italics added] to speak.”5 Moreover, because García and other bilingual employees could “readily
comply” with the English-only rule, the court dismissed the claim
that the rule had a disparate impact on Hispanic employees.6
Since García v. Gloor, the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) has provided guidelines indicating that English-only workplace rules do indeed have a disproportionate impact
on those of foreign origin, even bilinguals such as Héctor García.7
Given that primary language is an immutable characteristic closely
tied to national origin, the EEOC further suggests that courts take
the mere existence of an English-only rule as a prima facie case
of discrimination, thus making employers responsible for providing
thorough business justifications for such policies. However, because
the EEOC’s word holds no binding authority, courts that choose to
apply its interpretation are anomalies.8 In fact, many courts continue
to legitimize employers’ often arbitrary English-only rules and subsequently contribute to the marginalization of certain ethnic groups
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by allowing them to be reprimanded,9 demoted,10 and even fired11 for
noncompliance with rules that reinforce their “second class” status.12
We argue that the ambiguity of the term national origin in Title
VII has occasioned these inconsistent interpretations of Englishonly workplace cases, which allows for similar cases to go through
different pathways of interpretation and has often, in consequence,
unduly harmed Hispanic plaintiffs. Moreover, because many courts
are currently unwilling to rely on the EEOC’s guidelines designed
for interpreting Title VII, they have instead fallen back on dominant
ethnocentric cultural ideologies. These actions by the court have legitimized the ‘symbolic power’ of cultural ideologies and contributed to the marginalization of those of foreign origin. In light of this
current ambiguity and the resulting adverse effects, we advocate an
amendment to Title VII that explicitly grants protection of linguistic
traits.
In part I of this article, we give a background of Title VII, explain the problematic nature of its ambiguous language, and examine
the role of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
guidelines in the interpretation of Title VII. Part II provides a sociological framework for understanding the mechanisms at work in
English-only cases. In part III, we apply the framework to Englishonly cases and demonstrate that courts legitimize cultural ideologies
in place of following the EEOC’s guidelines which is associated with
plaintiffs’ claims being unduly discredited. In part IV, we suggest an
amendment to Title VII that includes both an addition of linguistic
traits, and a specification of how discrimination based on these traits
would be scrutinized. In Part V we address counter-arguments and
show why, despite possible uncertainty, there is a great necessity for
this suggested amendment to Title VII.
9
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II. Background on Title VII, Current Problems and
Methods of Interpretation, and the EEOC
(i) Title VII and National Origin
The landmark Civil Rights Act of June 2nd, 1964, aimed to mollify discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin in government institutions, schools, the workplace, and other
public domains.13 The legislation intended to mitigate economic, social, and spatial inequality based on the aforementioned characteristics and bring an end to a segregation that had plagued much of the
country. Title VII was a fundamental part of the Civil Rights Act,
in so much as it would outlaw discriminatory and unjust hiring and
employment practices that were commonplace at the time. Title VII
decreed it unlawful for an employer or an employing agency
to fail or to refuse to hire or to discharge any individual,
or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his [or her] compensation, terms, conditions or
privileges of employment….or to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his
[or her] status as an employee, because of such individual’s
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.14
Accordingly, Title VII extended racial and religious minority groups,
women, and those of foreign origin greater protection and rights in
the job market.
While in many ways the statutory language of Title VII is ambiguous, it is the vagueness of the term nation origin that we wish
to examine. That is, the concept of discrimination based on national
origin is accompanied with neither a description of national origin
and its significance nor recognition of the type of discrimination that
should be prohibited by Title VII. For example, did this mean immi13

Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub.L. No.88–352, 78 Stat. 241.

14
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grants could not be discriminated against? If so, were the children
of immigrants likewise protected? What would discrimination based
on national origin look like? Legal scholar Juan Perea argues that
the creators of the legislation are responsible for its enigmatic nature
arguing that “Congress gave no serious thought to the content of
the national origin term nor to its proper scope.”15 Thus, the statutory language of Title VII, while intended to combat discrimination,
makes it unclear which ethnic or social group the mandate exists for,
and how the discrimination would even be manifested.
Nevertheless, since Title VII’s enactment some plaintiffs have
made the case that national origin is tied to immutable ethnic traits,
such as physical features, ancestry, surname, accent, and language,
and have subsequently claimed that occupational discrimination on
the basis of these traits is a proxy for national origin discrimination.16
Under this rationale, the characteristics one inherits from his or her
own country of origin, or parents, grandparents, great-grandparents’
country of origin, for instance, should not be the reason for which he
or she is not hired, fired, or subject to other kinds of occupational discrimination. Yet there is little or no consensus about an individual’s

15
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Discrimination Under Title VII. 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 805-870, 807
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16
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linguistic characteristics17 and whether or not the traits are rightfully
ascribed to a national origin.18
(ii) The role of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
To aid with the enforcement and interpretation of Title VII, the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was created
at the same time.19 The EEOC’s guidelines were meant to be especially helpful with the interpretation of Title VII’s otherwise broad
17

See, e.g., García v. Spun Steak Co., supra note 10; Maldonado v. City of
Altus, supra note 7.

18

In the case that a court considers employees, whose first language is not
English, protected under Title VII, the most common approach to making
a claim of discrimination is disparate impact. Disparate impact is defined
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one social group more so than the same practices are towards those who
are not members of the protected group. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). Disparate impact is contrasted against disparate treatment approaches which happen when an employer or employing agency intentionally “treats some people less favorably than others
because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” Id. For a
plaintiff to successfully establish a prima facie case for disparate impact
he or she must first provide evidence of a disparity. Next, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that the employer’s implementation of a specific policy
or practice has caused the aforementioned disparity. Then the plaintiff
must show that the practice in question is not justified by business necessity, and that the employer could have alternatively used less extreme
policies which would have served the business’ needs in an equal manner.
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).

19

Interestingly, in the early drafts of H.R. 405, the bill that would dictate
the specific role of the EEOC, the House Committee intended to create a
board that would not only establish guidelines for interpretation of Title
VII, but would also take on the responsibility of carrying out the judicial
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deciding on complaints of discrimination under Title VII. However, in the
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as an administrative board that would investigate claims of discrimination
under Title VII and provide interpretation for the statute, but the decisive
judicial power remained with the courts. Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM.L. REV. 431 (1966).
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and vague statutory language. In fact, the EEOC developed an extensive concept from the statutory language of “national origin.”
The EEOC’s Guidelines on Discrimination Because of National
Origin delineate a clearer interpretation of national origin, stating
that Title VII protects against employer’s or an employing agency’s
discriminatory action “because an individual has the physical, cultural or linguistic characteristics of a national origin group.”20 Going
further than the bare meaning of the statute, the EEOC also openly
addresses English-only rules stating:
[Any] rule requiring employees to speak only English at all
times in the workplace is a burdensome term and condition
of employment. The primary language of an individual is
often an essential national origin characteristic. Prohibiting employees at all times, in the workplace, from speaking their primary language or the language they speak most
comfortably, disadvantages an individual’s employment opportunities on the basis of national origin. It may also create an atmosphere of inferiority, isolation and intimidation
based on national origin which could result in a discriminatory working environment. Therefore, the Commission will
presume that such a rule violates title VII and will closely
scrutinize it.21
The EEOC does allow however, for employers to apply English-only rules to certain times or situations, given that the employer “can
show that the rule is justified by business necessity.”22 Furthermore,
the employer must inform his or her “employees of the general circumstances when speaking only in English is required and the consequences of violating the rule.”23 Nevertheless the EEOC presumes

20
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that existence of an English-only rule of any sort establishes the
plaintiff’s prima facie case.24
While Discrimination Because of National Origin is much
clearer about the meaning of national origin and how discrimination
based thereon is manifested, courts have not endorsed the EEOC’s
guidelines with much consensus. Because the EEOC’s interpretation does not establish legally binding authority,25 courts have openly rejected the EEOC’s English-only guideline.26 The rationale for
dismissal is generally that an English-only rule does not inherently
imply a prima facie discriminatory impact on bilinguals,27 and/or
that linguistic characteristics or aspects of an individual’s “cultural
heritage” are not even protected under Title VII.28

24

Harold S. Lewis, Jr. & Elizabeth J. Norman, Employment Discrimination
Law and Practice 81 (2d ed. 2004) 81 (“Even if the rule is limited to certain times, the EEOC guideline... gives it the same prima facie effect …)

25

See, e.g., Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., Inc., 414 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1973).

26

See, e.g., García v. Spun Steak Co., supra note 10, at 1489 (in which
the court openly rejects the EEOC guidelines); Kania v. Archdiocese of
Phila., 14 F. Supp. 2d 730, 735-36 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (court also rejects
EEOC guidelines); Tran v. Standard Motor Prods., Inc., 10 F. Supp. 2d
1199, 1211 (D. Kan. 1998) (court rejects, without discussion, the EEOC’s
presumption); Long v. First Union Corp., 894 F. Supp. 933, 940 (E.D. Va.
1995) (court rejects the EEOC’s presumption); EEOC v. Beauty Enters.,
Inc., No. 3:01CV378 (AHN), 2005 WL 2764822, at *11 (D.Conn. Oct. 25,
2005) ( court rejects the EEOC’s presumption);

27
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Jurado v. Eleven-Fifty Corp., 813 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1987) at 1411 (a
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business-related English-only rule against an employee who can readily
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III. Symbolic Power, In-grouping-Out-grouping, and
Fundamental Attribution Error
Social theorist Pierre Bourdieu argues that language is a symbolic system, which among many other functions, can be used as
an “instrument of domination.” 29 Put basically, our different uses
of language are exhibitions of our relative positions of power in a
social setting. Therefore those in positions of power can establish
and maintain the legitimacy of specific linguistic and cultural ideologies. Meanwhile those who do not speak the dominant tongue are
consequently subject to “symbolic domination” in a field wherein the
“symbolic power [of an official language] is misrecognized as (and
therefore transformed into) legitimate power.”30
Dominant language ideologies often give way to binary categorization of “us vs. them,” which can subsequently result in the creation of “in-groups” and “out-groups.” The formation of these social
boundaries changes how we cognitively interpret others and their
behaviors. For instance, social-psychologist Susan Fiske and her colleagues have found that those whom we consider similar to us and
part of our “in-group” we generally perceive as more competent and
warm, meanwhile those whom we cognitively categorize as different or part of an out-group are perceived to be less competent or
less warm, or both less competent and less warm.31 Subsequently the
ethnocentric ideology of a dominant in-group has often resulted in
the dehumanization and undue treatment of out-group members.32
The conception of cultural ideologies and out-groups based on
categorical factors like language also contributes to mechanisms of
29

PIERRE BOURDEU, LANGUAGE AND SYMOBLIC POWER 165
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1991).
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bias that we make when interpreting the action of others. One of
these mechanisms is referred to as the fundamental attribution error.
The social-psychologist who coined this term, Lee Ross, found that
we have the tendency to understand and over-attribute the behavior
of others to their personal choice and dispositional factors, frequently underestimating the situational and other external constraints or
influences.33 Furthermore, social-psychologist Thomas Pettigrew
found that members of an in-group tend to make the fundamental
attribution error when explaining the behavior of members of an
out-group, often grossly underestimating the situational and social
contexts that shape behavior.34 Thus the way in which we cognitively
group people influences not only how we feel about them but also
how we understand and explain their actions.
In sum, language is used for the establishment and reproduction
of a cultural linguistic ideology. Those who do not use the official
tongue and align with a cultural ideology held by those embedded
in power are subject to symbolic and unquestioned domination and
therefore are cognitively made part of an out-group. Categorization
into an out-group changes the very way in which one is perceived
and understood by those who belong to an in-group. Members of
an in-group often overlook the structural, environmental, and situational constraint influencing an out-group member’s behavior, and
attribute his or her action to personal choice.

33

Lee Ross, The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions
in the Attribution Process, 10 Advances in experimental social psychology
173, 173-220 (1977) (Thus following this attribution logic, poor people
are poor not because they were born into a disadvantaged situation with
little resources or because they lost their job or experienced a divorce,
rather it is due to their laziness, carelessness, irresponsibility, and lack of
work ethic).

34

Thomas F. Pettigrew, The Ultimate Attribution Error: Extending Allport’s
Cognitive Analysis of Prejudice, 5(4), PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL
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IV. Analysis
This section applies the previously outlined sociological framework to English-only court cases to underline some of the social
mechanisms at work with the current ambiguous interpretation
of Title VII. This section further illustrates the several pathways
through which courts can take a case involving English-only due the
aforementioned problems of interpretation. The ambiguity of Title
VII also allows courts to use ethnocentric cultural ideologies as a
reference point which leads to cognitive in-grouping and out-grouping. Hispanic plaintiffs, as members of an out-group, are generally
understood as having a cultural deficit from the point of view of
the ethnocentric in-group; subsequently, their claims receive more
scrutiny than employers, and their adverse outcomes are often understood as self-inflicted.
(i) Evidence of Cultural Bias and Out-grouping of Hispanic
Plaintiffs
By closely examining the language and reasoning of courts, we
can uncover subtle evidence of a cultural ideology and cognitive
grouping. In certain cases, both employers and court officials demonstrate that they view the Hispanic plaintiffs as inferior in warmth,
competence, or both. Take for example the case introduced in the beginning of this paper, García v Gloor; the court not only dismissed
García’s claim that the English-only rule had disparate impact on
him and his fellow Hispanic-American co-workers, but also compared García’s ethnic traits to a deleterious addiction:
In similar fashion [referring to Gloor’s use of an Englishonly policy], an employer might, without business necessity,
adopt a rule forbidding smoking on the job. The Act would
not condemn that rule merely because it is shown that most
of the employees of one race smoke, most of the employees
of another do not and it is more likely that a member of the
race more addicted to tobacco would be disciplined.35
35

Garcia v Gloor, supra note 1, at 270.
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While the metaphor is flawed for several reasons, perhaps the most
blatant of these is the underlying assertion that the Spanish language
is easily likened to secondhand smoke. Although such a loaded
statement may not be intentional, the fact that the court later refers
to speaking Spanish as a “forbidden taint,”36 corroborates and undoubtedly reveals the court’s ethnocentric frame of reference. The
notion that primary language is immutable and considered a trait,
while smoking is a behavior, also shows a major conceptual misrepresentation.
Conversely, in most other cases the court itself has not made
conspicuous associations between a foreign language and negatively
connotative terms. Courts have however, accepted similar correlations from employers as a priori in the justification of Englishonly rules. That is, courts have generally deferred to employers’
justification that the allowance of Spanish or other languages in the
workplace creates an “offensive,”37 “derisive,”38 “uncomfortable,” 39
racially antagonistic,40 intimidating,41 isolating,42 humiliating43 and
ridiculing44 environment. Laden in these claims are assumptions
about Hispanics and the Spanish language that are backed by scant

36

Garcia v Gloor, supra note 1, at 268

37

Kania v. Archdiocese of Philadelphia, supra note 27, at 732.

38

Id.

39

Pacheco v. New York Presbyterian Hosp., supra note 8, at 621.

40

Garcia v Spun Steak, supra note 10, at 1483 (Kenneth Bertelson, president
of Spun Steak, claimed the English-only policy gave the company racial
harmony).

41

Id. at 1489.

42

Id. at 1489.

43

Id. at 1483.

44

Pacheco v. New York Presbyterian Hospital, supra note 8, at 606.
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and vague evidence.45 Unfortunately, the fact that courts put such
premises under little scrutiny, inadvertently equates Spanish in the
workplace with gossip, insults, and toxic substances, and further legitimizes a dominant Anglo-centric cultural ideology.
As if the unchallenged smearing of their dignity were not
enough, bilingual Hispanic employees must fight an uphill battle
when it comes to debunking the raison d’être of their employer’s
discriminatory rules, even though the burden of proof that the policy
is not discriminatory should rightfully fall on employers’ business
justification. Instead of the mere presence of any English-only rule
being accepted as a prima facie case of discrimination, as the EEOC
recommends, courts generally expect Hispanic employees to produce a “substantial [amount of] objective”46 evidence that any harm
is caused. Courts often regard as “subjective”47 Hispanic plaintiffs’
claims that being commanded to speak English or lose their jobs
creates a burdensome, hostile, isolating, and intimidating work environment that makes them feel inferior or “like garbage.”48 Even the
courts that acknowledge English-only rules’ disparate effect tend to
follow the reasoning of García v. Spun Steak that:
Title VII is not meant to protect against rules that merely
inconvenience some employees, even if the inconvenience
falls regularly on a protected class. Rather, Title VII protects
against only those policies that have a significant impact.
45

See, e.g., Alfredo Mirandé, En la Tierra del Ciego, El Tuerto es Rey” (“In
the Land of the Blind, the One Eyed Person is King”): Bilingualism as a
Disability, 26 N.M. L. REV. 75, 102-03 (1996) (Mirandé gives a thorough
examination of the assumptions being made and the lack of evidence in
most English-only cases).

46

Pacheco v. New York Presbyterian Hospital, supra note 8, at 623; Brewster v. City of Poughkeepsie, 447 F. Supp. 2d 342, 347 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).

47

Brewster v. City of Poughkeepsie, supra note 50 (Court claimed there was
little objective evidence); Pacheco v. New York Presbyterian Hospital, supra note 8, at 626 (Court finds that “Plaintiff has failed to raise a genuine
issue of material fact that the conditions of Plaintiff’s employment were
sufficiently severe or pervasive to create an objectively hostile or abusive
work environment”).

48

Brewster v. City of Poughkeepsie, supra note 50, at 350.
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The fact that an employee may have to catch himself or herself from occasionally slipping into Spanish does not impose
a burden significant enough to amount to the denial of equal
opportunity49
Thus some courts dismiss discriminatory claims, which according
to the EEOC should be accepted as prima facie, because plaintiffs
do not have enough substantial or quantitative evidence. While other
courts recognize there is an impact, but cite it as a mere inconvenience to workers.
(ii) The Creation of In-group Alliances with Employers
Yet when placed under scrutiny, courts’ standards of proof
and accuracy appear to be contradictory. On one hand, courts reject plaintiffs’ claims because they lack depth and data, while on
the other hand the court exonerates employers with similarly flimsy and poorly articulated business justifications. For instance, one
of the most frequently used business necessities for English-only
rules is that such policies allow supervisors to better oversee their
subordinates,50 but defendants do not provide an explanation or evidence that delineates how speaking Spanish inhibits supervision.
Those employers who do provide an explanation about supervision
say the absence of an English-only rule leads to misunderstanding
or miscommunications; while this is plausible, there is no “objective’
demonstration that such is the case, nor do employers give evidence
that Hispanic employees are in contact with supervisors enough to
justify speaking English at all times besides breaks.
An equally cited business justification for English-only rules is
that allowing Spanish and other languages to be spoken creates a
“hostile work environment.”51 Kenneth Bertelson, president of Spun
Steak, alleged that the English-only rule existed to “promote racial
harmony” in the workplace, yet he provided a singular example of
49

Garcia v. Spun Steak, supra note 10, at 1488.

50

See, e.g., Garcia v. Gloor, supra note 1, at 267.

51

Garcia v. Spun Steak, supra note 10, at 1489.
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two Hispanic workers who were suspected of talking about another
employee who was African-American.52 While it is a possibility that
the employees’ remarks were racially charged or motivated by bias,
Bertelson provides no “genuine issue of material fact”53 that Hispanic employees targeted the African-American employee because
of race. Outside of one possible incident, Bertelson does nothing to
demonstrate that there was a widespread racial tension that existed
and that the environment was so problematic that a harmony promoting English-only rule became exigent.
(iii) When Courts Follow the EEOC Guidelines
There are, however, a few courts that have adhered to EEOC
guidelines and consequently thoroughly scrutinized employers’
business justifications. For example, the court ruling on the case of
Premier Operator Services, a call center where several employees
were fired for violating an English-only rule, closely examined the
aforementioned business justifications of “harmony” and “improved
supervision” and ruled in the plaintiffs’ favor. The court maintained
that there was no evidence of a “discord” in the first place that would
justify an English-only rule to engender “harmonization,” in fact,
the rule had quite the opposite effect and “served to create disruption [italics added].” 54 Likewise the court in Premier Operator Services points out that allowing Hispanic employees to communicate
with each other in Spanish did not in any way limit their ability “to
communicate with their supervisors and managers… in carrying out
their job duties and responsibilities.”55 In similar case, Maldonado v.
City of Altus, the court again used the EEOC guidelines to interpret
the case and ruled in favor of the plaintiff after dissecting another

52

Garcia v. Spun Steak, supra note 10, at 1483.

53

Pacheco v. New York Presbyterian Hospital, supra note 8, at 607; Garcia
v. Spun Steak, supra note 10, at 1488.

54

EEOC v. Premier Operator Services, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1071
(N.D. Tex. 2000).

55

Id.
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weak business justification.56 These two courts’ analyses of employers’ rationales for English-only rules demonstrate that business necessities legitimized in other cases are openly rejected when placed
under scrutiny.
(iv) Fundamental Attribution Error and Further Evidence of an Ingroup, Out-group Bias
Further reifying evidence of an in-group, out-group bias, courts
are culpable of falling into the fundamental attribution error when it
comes to how they understand plaintiffs, plaintiff’s actions, and the
contexts in which plaintiffs are located. For instance, the language
used by the court in Gloor places an undue and unfair emphasis on
Hector García’s agency and personal characteristics while endorsing Gloor’s grounds for firing García. The court admitted that an
English-only rule could be discriminatory, but concedes that “...there
is no disparate impact if the rule is one that the affected employee
can readily observe and nonobservance is a matter of individual
preference. Mr. García could readily comply with the speak-Englishonly rule; as to him nonobservance was a matter of choice.”57 Further shifting the weight of the negative consequences to García, the
court repeatedly accentuates that he was “fully bilingual,”58 “fully
capable,”59 and that García constantly “exercised a preference,”60 and
thus “chose deliberately [italics added] to speak Spanish instead of
English.”61
56

Maldonado v. City of Altus, supra note 7, at 1307 (The court picked apart
the City of Altus’ trite justifications that English-speaking employees
felt that Hispanics were talking about them, that allowing Spanish to be
spoken led to miscommunication and a hazardous environment, and that
Hispanics could not be properly supervised, pointing out that the “[d]
efendants’ evidence of business necessity in this case is scant”).
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The court’s focus on García’s salience as an actor alone does
not, however, characterize the fundamental attribution error in the
case, rather it is the combination of the aforementioned attribution
with a disregard for situational, structural, and external factors that
highlight the court’s correspondence bias. That is, the court gives
no weight to evidence that 1) García was responding to a request by
an employee who spoke Spanish when he was fired62, that 2) García
only spoke Spanish in his home63, that 3) most of Gloor’s employees were Mexican-Americans64, that 4) in Brownsville, Texas, Gloor
Lumber’s location, at least 75% of the population was MexicanAmerican65, and that 5) García was hired because he spoke Spanish.66 Furthermore, because García’s primary language was Spanish
he was subject to a neuro-linguistic schema that did not favor English67 and made reverting to Spanish a feat that García would frequently perform unconsciously regardless of his intentions.68 69
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Id. at 266.
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Id. at 266.
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Id. at 267.
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Id. at 267.
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Id. at 269.
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BILL PIATT, LANGUAGE ON THE JOB: BALANCING BUSINESS
NEES AND EMPLOYEE RIGHTS 121 (University of New Mexico
Press, 1993) (Piatt points out that when a primary language is learned
“it forms an immutable perspective and understanding,” from which the
learner likely cannot “consciously purge [himself].”That is, the learner
cannot change the “neurological processes” controlling that language
which has “been set in place from a very early age”).
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Itesh Sachdev & Howard Giles, Bilingual Accommodation, in THE
HANDBOOK OF BILINGUALISM 353, 359-60 (Tej K. Bhatia & William C. Ritchie eds., 2004) (showing bilinguals who find themselves
unconsciously code-switching consider the practice troublesome and unnecessary).
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Garcia v. Gloor, supra note 1, at 270. (While the court for Gloor admits
“language might well be an immutable characteristic like skin color, sex
or place of birth,” it ultimately returns to inflexible reasoning, imposing that “the language a person who is multi-lingual elects to speak at a
particular time is by definition a matter of choice [italics added],”).
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In a similar manner, subsequent cases reproduce the faulty logic
of Gloor, under-lining plaintiff’s’ choice and ability “to comply”
while downplaying extenuating circumstances. In Spun Steak, for
instance, the court argued that employees whose primary language
was Spanish were not subject to a discriminatory policy because
“they [were] able to speak English,” stating “there is no disparate impact with respect to privilege of employment ‘if the rule is one that
the affected employee can readily observe and nonobservance is a
matter of individual preference.”70 Furthermore, the Spun Steak court
is quick to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims that an English-only policy
is problematic to them for linguistic reasons arguing that “The fact
that a bilingual employee may… unconsciously substitute a Spanish
word in the place of an English one does not override our conclusion
that the bilingual employee can easily comply with the rule.”71Thus
the court in this case, and following cases, focuses on the plaintiffs’
individual preferences, arguing that Hispanic employees can elect
whether or not to “comply” with the policy, therefore such a policy
could not be discriminatory. The reasoning of this argument is erroneous, however, since it rests on the premise that any policy with
which one can physically comply is inherently non-discriminatory.
(v) EEOC Guidelines Help Prevent Fundamental Attribution Error
In other cases where the EEOC guidelines have been applied,
however, courts have shown a less narrow-minded understanding
of the circumstances in which plaintiffs worked and lived. Again,
the court in Premier Operator Services recognizes the context of
the discriminatory claim and dismisses the Gloor and Spun Steak
reasoning that
Nonobservance of the English-only policy was not simply a
matter of individual preference for the class members. On a
daily basis, the Hispanic employees of Defendant were faced
with the very real risk of being reprimanded or even losing their jobs if they violated the English-only rule, even if
70

Garcia v. Spun Steak, supra note 10, at 1487.

71

Id. at 1488.
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such non-compliance was inadvertent. There was no comparable risk posed by the policy for Defendant’s non-Hispanic
employees, particularly since they would not have the same
tendency to lapse into Spanish inadvertently. In fact, there
is no evidence that any person other than an employee of
Hispanic national origin was disciplined or terminated for
objecting to or violating the English-only policy.72
The court then debunks the reasoning of Gloor and Spun Steak by
arguing that “[s]ome of the most objectionable discriminatory rules
are the least obtrusive in terms of one’s ability to comply: being required to sit in the back of the bus for example.”73 Thus, in this case,
the court shifts its focus to the context of the rule and closely examines it to decide whether or not it is discriminatory, rather than
centering the discrimination claim on the plaintiffs’ ability for deference to the rule, recognizing the flawed final deduction of Gloor and
Spun Steak.
In sum, the ambiguous statutory language of Title VII allows
for courts to make judgments from the standpoint of an in-group
ethnocentric ideology. In some cases, the courts themselves devaluate plaintiffs’ ethnic traits, while in other cases courts accept employers’ devaluations. This process reifies the formation of in-groups
and out-groups, which is made manifest through courts’ inconsistencies in their scrutiny of plaintiffs’ and defendants’ claims. That is,
while many of employers’ business justifications are likely credible,
the lack of objective and quantitative evidence make them qualitatively no different than plaintiffs’ disparate impact claims. Yet the
court’s willingness to connect the logical dots, and fill in the empirical blanks for employers in the majority of these cases can result in
outcomes that favor employers. Further playing a role in the reifica72
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73

Id. at 1075 ([quoting Judge Reinhardt who wrote the dissent in the denial
of rehearing in Spun Steak] The court also points out that “Under this
analysis, a black employee could not challenge a rule requiring the use of
separate bathrooms and drinking rooms; an Orthodox Jew could not challenge a rule forbidding the wearing of head coverings. The ease of compliance with a rule should not be the measure of its discriminatory effect”).
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tion of dominant in-group ideology, courts’ fundamental attribution
error in terms of understanding plaintiffs’ actions and experience,
shapes how they misidentify discrimination and subsequently contribute to marginalization of a traditionally marginalized group.

V. Potential Solutions
Because the statutory language of Title VII prohibiting workplace discrimination based on national origin provides no clear definition of the protected class for whom the measure exists, much less
how discrimination of this type would manifest itself, we recommend revisions through legislation. While certain courts have made
meaning for “national origin” in their interpretation, these readings
are inconsistent and fail to incorporate the EEOC’s guidelines in
their entirety. Furthermore, current lack of consensus among courts
allows for the legitimization of a dominant cultural ideology and subsequent discrimination to occur. It is therefore exigent that Congress
make an amendment to protect linguistic traits that are correlated
with, but not universally accepted as part of, one’s national origin.
The traits protected under this amendment could also include, but
not be limited to, accent, physical ethnic features and both first and
last names. 74
With these changes, however, there is still some ambiguity concerning what discrimination on the basis of the aforementioned traits
would look like. Consequently, we suggest that in the cases where
the EEOC has previously written guidelines concerning discrimination, these guidelines should be considered by legislative bodies as
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Perea, supra note 16, at 861 (In a similar vein, Perea suggests something
similar calling for a protection against discrimination on basis of language, accent, surname, and ethnic appearance).
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the groundwork for the proposed amendment.75 Moreover, here we
offer an example of some clear principles of the proposed subsection
of the amendment dealing specifically with linguistic traits in the
work place. First, the existence of any English-only policy should
be accepted as a prima facie case of discrimination, and therefore,
under the theory of disparate impact, the burden of proof should fall
on employers. Next, in scrutinizing an employer’s business justifications, the court should examine 1) whether the English-only policy
is supported by a legitimate business necessity,76 2) whether the employer’s business necessity is both logically and empirically justified given the nature of the work, 3) whether the English-only rule
has been tailored as narrowly as possible to the occasions in which
the previously established business necessity demands, 4) whether
the policy and the justification thereof is thoroughly documented by
employers, 5) whether the affected employees are aware that such a
policy is in place 6) whether the affected employees are aware of and
understand to which specific work situations the policy applies, and
7) whether the employees know that “isolated, accidental violations
of the policy will not result in adverse employment action.”77
75

See, e.g., Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 402 U.S. 689, 91 S. Ct. 2186, 29
L. Ed. 2d 267 (1971), and Harry T. Edwards & Joel H. Kaplan, Religious
Discrimination and the Role of Arbitration Under Title VII, 69 MICH.
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guidelines. In the cases which are not covered by the EEOC, I suggest the
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schools, government facilities, etc. While adapting the EEOC’s guidelines
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have consistently adapted the EEOC’s guidelines in the case of religious
discrimination).
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VI. Counter Arguments
There are several premises that the previously outlined claims
rest upon that can be drawn into question by counter arguments.
First, a counter argument that could be made against these claims
is that an English-only rule is not equally discriminatory for all bilinguals. Our presentation of bilingual abilities as equal is, indeed,
somewhat of an oversimplification of bilinguals’ differing abilities;
as Christian Garza points out, language abilities should be thought
of as different points on a wide spectrum rather than a simple binary category of bilingual or not bilingual.78 While it is true that two
Hispanic bilingual individuals’ abilities to speak both English and
Spanish may vary greatly, and that an English-only policy may consequently present greater linguistic difficulty for one more so than
it does for another, the point of our argument is not that Englishonly rules are discriminatory because they may be difficult for all
bilinguals to comply with. Instead, our argument is that Englishonly rules are unjustly burdensome and discriminatory towards all
bilinguals because, as the plaintiff in Maldonado said, the rule is a
reminder that bilinguals are “subject to rules for [their] employment
that the Anglo employees are not subject to…this rule is hanging
over [their] head and can be used against [them] at any point when
the [employer] wants to have something to write [them up] for.”79
Furthermore, a potential counter-argument against the proposed
revision is that such a measure would be overly rigid and could hinder businesses’ efficiency and interests. That is, the added measure
would protect employees’ interests at the expense of the employer,
and could result in employers wrongfully being found guilty of discrimination because the mere presence of an English-only rule would
require employers to overcome a hefty burden of proof. However, it
is in both employers and employees’ interest that any employed business policy is clearly thought out, justified, articulated, and under78

Christian A. Garza, Measuring Language Rights Along a Spectrum, 110
Yale L.J. 379 (2000).
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stood, especially a policy determining when and where English is
spoken. In fact, by tailoring such policies to make English-only situations as narrow as possible, we suggest that employee morale and
employee-employer relations are more likely to improve. Moreover,
the strict adherence of employers to this policy will allow them to
have a clearer understanding of what is and is not acceptable under
law, thereby preventing unnecessary litigation costs. Thus, if applied
correctly, these types of revisions to Title VII that seemingly restrict
employers could actually be an asset to their businesses.
Another possible outcome of the proposed amendment would
be the transfer of discrimination to the supply networks from which
businesses hire. That is, with the more rigorous criteria for Englishonly rules in the work place, employers, fearing or not wanting to
deal with anti-discriminatory sanctions, may attempt to avoid compliance with such sanctions by choosing not to hire job candidates
who are bilingual. While this is a valid concern, such discrimination
would become apparent and is likewise prosecutable under Title VII.
Moreover, in a nation with a growing immigrant population and with
over 60 million citizens whose primary language is not English,80 the
demand for bilingual employees is already extant. Thus the failure of
employers to hire bilingual employees, because of fear of complying
with anti-discrimination measures, would likely stifle business success and growth in increasingly multicultural markets.

VII. Conclusion
The United States has been constructed, populated, re-constructed, and re-populated by people of many different ethnicities, colors,
religions and languages. Despite its diverse composition and the enactment of laws designed to mitigate discrimination, the American
society is still subject to tacit modes of cultural domination. While
blatant discrimination is easily recognized and penalized, the sym80

Camille Ryan, “Language use in the United States: 2011,” Washington, DC: US Census Bureau, August (2013) (National data show that
60,637,010 Americans speak languages that are not English in their
homes).
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bolic power of dominant cultural ideologies is maintained in a nearly
unconscious manner in the every-day social interactions workers experience.
To the dismay of those marginalized by cultural hierarchy, such
as those whose primary language is not English, courts have failed
to bring justice. Instead courts have legitimized the symbolic power
of the dominant cultural ideology. The failure to adhere to the legitimized cultural ideology results in those whose primary language is
not English to be out-grouped and perceived as less warm, less competent and more responsible for their own suffering. Thus those who
are marginalized in their workplaces are also marginalized in the
American legal system. Because Title VII, the very law designed to
protect those most likely to be out-grouped and marginalized, is unclear, courts often allow for further discrimination to occur. While
the EEOC offers principles to guide interpretation of Title VII, the
lack of EEOC’s authority and courts’ unwillingness to adhere to the
outlined principles has resulted in disparity in terms of interpretation. It is therefore exigent that Title VII be revised to protect ethnic
traits, and apply the suggestions outlined the EEOC’s guidelines and
in this article.

